Zhang Dashuai's governance and the Party Command Gun - Wenmiao - World Wide Blog - World Wide Reader Network (Computer Version)

——From Zhang Zuolin to Zhang Youxia, the path of military power that has remained unchanged for a hundred years

"The Party Commands the Gun" is the Ding Haishen needle in the mouth of the politicians of the Communist Party of China; "The Gun Protects the Party" is the real script that is frequently staged in history. From the melee of the Beiyang warlords, to the establishment of the Red Regime, to the twinkling stars of the Lieutenant General of the Military Commission today - Zhang Youxia is like a silent marble statue, lying on the central axis of modern Chinese military power. The appearance of this "modern Fengtian Zhang Dashuai" not only awakened Zhang Zuolin's shadow, but also colluded with a series of old accounts of military and government intervention - Duan Qirui, Lin Biao, and even Yang Dezhi and Liu Huaqing, each of them played an important role in the play of "Gun Pointing to the Party".

Zhang Youxia: Silent soldiers, noisy military government

According to many reports by Reuters and the South China Morning Post, Zhang Youxia holds a key position in the military commission system, which not only involves the personnel layout after military reform, but also often exerts a substantial influence in the decision-making circle with "low-key and high control". His father, Zhang Zongxun, a founding general, served in the Northwest Military Region during his lifetime and

had old friends with Xi Zhongxun. The background of the Second Red Dynasty gave him a natural legitimacy of "military inheritance".

Under the "party's command gun", Zhang Youxia is not a slogan general like Xu Qiliang, but a hub figure who actually dispatches troops and influences strategy.

In 2016, Ben Bo put forward the lament of Xi Jiajun: Xi Jinping, who was inferior and arrogant, with a distorted personality, grew up in a family and environment in the northwestern countryside, coupled with the three views of primary education and the struggle for power of the court, it was not surprising to embark on the road of the Xi Jiajun who was responsible for everything. I have observed him for four years before my lament was formed. The inevitable fate of the failure of our own army has long been predestined. It is only the timing and way of defeat, leaving people with infinite suspense. Zhang Youxia is the "best" candidate to come out of the Xi family's military system. Just like the Yuan family army came from the new army of the Qing Dynasty. Yuan could not end well. It is said that he was soon angry to death. This was the source of the big and small Beiyang warlords.

In 2024, Ben Bo once warned many times that in many articles discussing the chaos in Beijing that internal strighes and the "constitutional government" crisis after the end of the pot, the old man's government can break the totalitarian rule of "one respect", but the impact or consequences may be unpredictable. Looking back on the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the subsequent history of disintegration may leave people with more thoughts and lessons.

Historical echo: from the Beiyang system to the Standing Committee of the Military Commission

Duan Qirui: Known as the "head of the Beiyang", he once monopolized the political situation of Beijing with the attitude of "politically

established by force". Its "Anhui" forces were finally defeated by Feng Guozhang, but they opened the way for soldiers to do politics.

Zhang Zuolin: Relying on the military power of the army to control North China for a while, the logic of governing the country was to "go out of order" and even respond to diplomatic suppression with "gun sound". He finally died in the explosion of Huanggutun, which ironically marked the end of the military rule of the country.

Lin Biao: In the Mao era, he was the strongest spokesperson of the "Party Command Gun", and even became the successor. However, after the "September 13 Incident", Lin Ben went to Mongolia to destroy people and died, and the tragedy of "derailment" between the party and the gun occurred again.

Liu Huaqing: Known as the "father of the navy", he proposed the "Taiwan naval exercise" to toughly deal with the U.S. aircraft carrier in the "September 6 Crisis", showing the military's diplomatic independence.

From these examples, it can be seen that military and political intervention in Chinese politics is never an accidental phenomenon, but a kind of "inertia in the gap of the system".

Logical silhouette: The entanglement between "governing the country" and "protecting the party"

Ben Bo once sarcastically: "The Communist Party of China has never really removed Beiyang-style politics, but packaged it with more sophisticated organization." Indeed, although today's army wears digital camouflage, drives drones, and participates in overseas peacekeeping, it is still an old logic that "soldiers must understand politics, and politicians must also understand military tactics".

This kind of layout can't help but look back to the Beiyang era - Zhang

Zuolin did not rely on finance or public opinion at the peak of his power, but relied on hundreds of thousands of soldiers to control the political situation in the northeast and left and right in Beijing. And did Zhang Youxia also use the army to redraw the "gun pointing party map" outside the Zhongnanhai?

Zhang Zuolin's shadow, Zhang Youxia's photo?

Ben Bo often said, "The politics of the Communist Party of China seems to be modern on the surface, but in fact, it is still deeply buried in the bones of the Beiyang habit." Zhang Zuolin's government pays attention to "manipating the people with the army". Zhang Youxia is also good at "military thinking about governing the country".

Between the two, although it is a hundred years apart, if the ideological package is removed, only the most essential power game is left - do soldiers obey politics, or do politics succumb to military power?

Zhang Youxia's role is not in military technology, but in "stability expectation" - the army is shaped into the ultimate insurance mechanism of the Communist Party of China. This layout makes the relationship between "gun pointing to the party" and "party pointing gun" no longer antagonism, but a kind of role integration.

There is no marshal above Zhang Youxia, and no one under him dares to speak. It is rumored that he held real power in the Military Commission, far surpassing Xu Qiliang, the former deputy who had died. Many "generals and stars" came from the old department of the Zhang family, just like the "military system" at that time. Although today's "Marshal Zhang" has not made many achievements, in the institutional layout after the reform of the Communist Party of China's army, it has become a symbol of a new generation of "power from the gun pole".

The iron rule of the Party's command of the gun, which has been

engraved in the bone marrow of the Communist Party of China since the Mao Zedong era, has never been really loosened.

However, when the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2022 closed and Zhang Youxia appeared again around the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau with an expressionless "military temperament", a new drama of "Party command Zhang" seemed to open quietly. This is not that, but it seems to be a copy of history - Zhang Zuolin, the "Fengtian Marshal" in the 1920s, who transferred troops and generals back and forth between Beijing and Tianjin, once became the representative of the highest peak of Beiyang warlords. A hundred years later, Zhang Youxia, the "second-generation general star of the party", seems to have shown a special attitude of governing the country at the military level.

The analogy of Zhang Youxia and Zhang Zuolin may not be ironic, but a pessimistic warning. When military power becomes the base of the legitimacy of the regime again, it shows that private trust can no longer carry the institutional operation. If politics does not rely on public opinion but only on military uniforms, it is neither democracy nor socialism, but "subdues politics".

In the early days of the founding of the Communist Party of China, there were a lot of domestic warlords, which made Su and Ri see the opportunity. Building an army, grasping military power, and letting the Communist International, a foreign force, unify the army, was once a unsclure strategy of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The essence of anti-imperialism and anti-repair in the 1960s was military power. In the official propaganda for a period of time, Xiu Bidi was "bad" and "evil". Because only by getting rid of the Soviet Union could Mao completely squeeze the gun barrel in his own hands, so that Zhou Liu and other original internationalists could completely submit and unify the world.

Sample of global military-government intervention: Marshal Zhang is not an isolated case

China's "party-directed gun" is also not an independent case. Many countries in the world have fallen into the mud of military and political entanglement. Zhang Youxia's silent rule of the army, the behind-the-scenes manipulation of the Pakistani military and the naked coup of the Myanmar military government, constitute a triangular sample of transnational military power governance.

Pakistan: The military is the "king" of politics

Since the establishment of the country in 1947, the Pakistani military has almost never really withdrawn from the political stage. Even in the wave of democratization, the military still maintains its substantive dominance over the civilian government by controlling foreign affairs, national defense, nuclear weapons and intelligence systems.

Coup tradition: From Ayub Khan to Musharraf, the Pakistani military has launched many coups to overthrow the democratically elected government.

Military manipulation election: In the 2024 election, the political party supported by the military still tried to maintain its influence by manipulating votes and suppressing the opposition after losing the election.

The military and political parties coexist: whether it is the Democratic League or the Justice Movement Party, they have cooperated with the military to come to power, and then turned against each other, forming a cycle of "military-government conspiracy-backlash-conspire".

Nuclear control controversy: There are even rumors that Pakistan's nuclear button is controlled by U.S. generals, triggering a sovereign

crisis.

The role of the Pakistani military is both a "national stabilizer" and a "democratic destroyer". His control of the regime is more secretive than Zhang Youxia's, but it is equally profound.

Myanmar: Soldiers sit directly on the presidential throne

The way of the Myanmar military is more rough. In the 2021 coup, the military arrested Aung San Suu Kyi on the grounds of "election fraud", overthrew the democratically elected government, and regained power.

Legalization of the coup: The military declared a state of emergency and established the "State Management Committee", and General Min Aung Lai directly promoted the position of head of state.

Suppression and airstrikes: After the coup, the military carried out bloody suppression of the protesters and airstriked villages, killing thousands of people.

Election trick: The military has repeatedly announced that it will hold new elections, but it has been postponed, trying to continue military power through "legal packaging".

International isolation: The United Nations and ASEAN have repeatedly condemned the Myanmar military regime, but it relies on a few allies such as China and Russia to survive.

Myanmar's "gun-pointing party" is no longer a metaphor, but a reality. Zhang Youxia's silence may not be "recisive" enough in the eyes of Myanmar soldiers.

Logical closed-loop: three modes of military power governance

	Military-government	Characteristic description

Country	intervention model	
China	The implicit dominance of military power	The second generation of the Red Army is in charge of the army. Under the appearance of the Party's command, the real power of the Military Commission is concentrated.
Pakistan	Behind-the-scenes manipulation of the military	The military controls diplomacy, nuclear weapons and intelligence, and political parties rely on the military to take power.
Myanmar	The soldiers directly govern.	The coup overthrows the democratically elected government, the soldiers take power, and the election becomes a decoration.

The difference between the three constitutes a "trio of military and political intervention": China is "soldiers do not speak but have the right to speak", Pakistan is "soldiers do not show their faces but control the whole situation", and Myanmar is "soldiers go directly to power without acting".

Zhang Youxia's official visit to Vietnam in late October 2024 is ostensibly a regular military diplomatic activity, but in fact there are many hidden political signals, which is worth in-depth analysis. This trip not only involves the upgrading of Sino-Vietnam defense cooperation, but also casts a stone in the subtle changes in the power structure of the Central and South China Sea.

High-standard reception: Why did Vietnam "be polite" Zhang Youxia?

Zhang Youxia's trip was received by the Vietnamese side near the head of state: the red carpet, the honor guard of the three armies, and the salute. Su Lin, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, President Liang Qiang, Premier Fan Mingzheng and Minister Pan Wenjiang all came to meet. Such a high

specification even exceeds the treatment of Premier Li Qiang during his previous visit to Vietnam.

What's more intriguing is that Zhang **did not mention Xi Jinping** at the meeting, while the Vietnamese leader took the initiative to mention Xi Shi, but Zhang avoided answering. This is extremely rare in the officialdom of the Communist Party of China, which shows that Zhang's trip is not only a military exchange, but also a diplomatic test of a "military representative".

The side shadow of the change of power in Zhongnanhai:

Zhang's trip took place during Xi Jinping's trip to Russia to attend the BRICS summit. The party media reported **almost no reports** on Zhang's visit to Vietnam, and Xinhua News Agency, People's Daily and Military Network did not mention it. This is in stark contrast to the overwhelming reports of the Vietnamese media.

Combined with Zhang Youxia's recent on-site meeting of the whole army's synthetic training and frequent attendance at military activities, it is widely speculated that he has mastered the substantive military power. This trip to Vietnam, or its "test" in the diplomatic field, verifies the independence of the military in foreign affairs.

Logical deduced: Zhang Youxia's "military diplomacy" connotation, Zhang's trip released several key signals:

Signal	Interpretation
High-standard reception	Vietnam regards Zhang as a real power figure, not just a deputy of the Military Commission.
Avoid talking about Xi Jinping	Show the subtle distance between the military and the core of the party
Sign a defense agreement	The military dominates regional security cooperation, and the role of diplomacy is rising.

The party media is silent	Zhongnanhai has a complicated attitude towards Zhang's trip, and may be deliberately suppressed.

Is it the diplomatic trial of the "gun command party"?

Zhang Youxia's visit to Vietnam is not only a military visit, but more like a preview of "military foreign treatment". Under the slogan of the Party's command of the gun, the gun pole quietly went to the front and began to speak out on the international stage. Vietnam's sensitive response and high-standard reception show that it has insight into the changes in Beijing's power structure. After all, it is still "comrades plus brothers"!

This visit is a diplomatic "Marshal Zhang-style appearance" and a real challenge to the myth of "party command gun". Zhang Youxia's military diplomacy: from Vietnam to Moscow to the Himalayas.

In October 2024, Zhang Youxia met with Russian Defense Minister Belousov at the Bayi Building in Beijing. The two sides promised to deepen cooperation between the two militaries and work together to maintain the global strategic balance. The talks took place in the same week as the Communist Party of China's military exercise in besiege of Taiwan. The party media treated Zhang's activities in a low-key manner, but reported in the Russian media. This meeting is not only a military cooperation, but also a diplomatic test of "soldiers bypassing civilian officials". Xi Jinping was almost not mentioned in Zhang's speech, which shows that the military has an independent say in Sino-Russian relations.

In October 2024, China and India reached a border agreement, returning to the state before the conflict in 2020. Although the agreement was announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to many analysis, Zhang Youxia played a key role in the military negotiations. This agreement not only eased the tension between China and India, but also added a touch to Zhang's "military diplomacy". On the border issue, the military's dominant position once again surpassed the traditional

diplomatic system.

It can be inferred that when Marshal Zhang left the customs, diplomacy is no longer exclusive to civil servants. Zhang Youxia's diplomatic activities are no longer accompanied by the military, but essentially dominate. The myth of the party's command of the gun has gradually been replaced by "gun-pointing diplomacy" on the international stage.

In the next step, will there be "Marshal Zhang's visit to Europe" and "military leaders in the Taiwan Strait negotiations"? We might as well continue to observe.

Historical reflection: warlords governing the country or institutional reform? Great unification is the pride of many Chinese people and the driving force for survival... And the so-called blood flowing in the bones. Warlords can maintain unity, but may also induce a civil war. Many people have been poor all their lives, but they can't figure out what they are pursuing or what ideals. Maybe the face of Da Yitong is really a talisman of some life?

Of course, excellent soldiers can take care of politics. People can cite many such examples, such as Chen Jiong's Meiji Guangdong and Duan Qirui Zhijing, each with its own wonderful stories, but they have gone beyond the topic of this article.

After Mao Zedong's death, Deng Xiaoping tried to limit military power with the sentence "the army cannot do politics", but in the era of Xi Jinping, this sentence was almost completely withdrawn. Zhang Youxia's appearance is not accidental, but inevitable - when the local and social can no longer support the confidence of the "absolute leadership of the Party", the army becomes the last steel guarantee. Zhang Youxia's military committee layout is a response to this lack of confidence, and may also be an advance layout of some uncertainty in the future.

A hundred years of one, the gun sleeps next to the party,

With the passage of time, the personnel is no longer there,

The problem has not been changed, but the habit is still the same.

Temple of Literature and Martial Arts, Confucius and Meng wandering,

Feudal system, the support of Marxism-Leninism,

Cultural accumulation of evils, emperor's consciousness,

Powerful China, who is in the master of the ups and downs?